On Sunday, 18 March 2018, Russian president Vladimir Putin was re-elected to a second consecutive term of six years. It is his fourth term overall, having had a four-year break as Prime Minister in [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] .
The outcome of this year's election was in little doubt: Putin was the favourite to win, according to all polls. But as CNN was reporting a few weeks before the vote, voter turnout was "one thing for [Putin] to worry about... It could be embarrassingly low, some polls suggest, and could raise questions about the legitimacy of Putin's long-running authority" (cnn.it/2H1fAtu). According to CNN: "The Kremlin wants the golden 70-70 -a win of 70% of the vote with a turnout of 70% -to give it a clear mandate and provide it with a riposte to Western leaders who criticize Russia as an autocracy."
In the event, the official turnout was a seemingly respectable 67.5%, with Putin securing 77% of the vote. However, there have been criticisms of the election process -and doubts have been cast over the validity of the outcome. For example, Golos, an election monitoring organisation, has documented incidents of ballot stuffing at various polling stations, and multiple other violations both before and during the election (bit.ly/2HawRD3).
Criticisms of this sort are not new. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Russia have been accused of being fraudulent since at least the middle of the 2000s. Such accusations have always been denied by Russian officials, but what if there were evidence of this fraud -fingerprints, as it were -in the official election data?
What do the data suggest?
In Russia, data from each polling station are freely available online after each election and include the number of registered voters, the number of people who participated in the election, and the number of ballots cast for each candidate. We can apply statistical analysis to these data to see if there are irregularities, which may serve as evidence of falsifications.
Arguably the two most important numbers that describe an election outcome are turnout percentage and leader's result percentage (with leader's result referring to Putin during presidential elections and the ruling United Russia party during parliamentary elections). These percentages are not reported in the data sets from individual polling stations but can be calculated from the information provided officially.
We (and others) have previously argued that due to human attraction to round numbers, largescale attempts to manipulate reported turnout or leader's results would likely show up as frequent whole (integer) percentages in the election data [KSP16a, Roz17] . In a previous Significance article, we gave the hypothetical example of a polling station with 1755 registered voters [KSP16b] . Here election officials decide to forge the results and report a turnout of 85%. They choose 85% because it is a round number which is more appealing than, say, 83.27%. As we explained: "To achieve a falsified turnout of 85%, this polling station needs to report 1755 × 0.85 = 1492 ballots cast... Note that the number 1492 is not remarkable in itself; it is only the resulting percentage value (i.e. the 1492/1755 ratio) that is round." Other polling stations making similar attempts at fraud may also choose 85% as their target value, so that when we look at the turnout percentages for all polling stations, we see a noticeable spike in the number of stations with turnout of 85%.
In our previous article, we found these integer peaks presidential election. These give us the opportunity to again test our hypothesis (see github.com/ dkobak/elections for data and code). Figure 1 shows histograms for turnout and leader's result at polling stations in the two most recent elections. As with previous elections, sharp periodic peaks are clearly visible at integer values (such as 91%, 92% and 93%) and at round integer values (such as 80%, 85% and 90%), rather than fractional values (such as 91.3%).
Comparing peak prevalence
Having again identified peaks at integer values, we wondered whether there had been any change in their prevalence over time, particularly given the scrutiny applied to past elections by the media and academics? To address this question, we compared the number of polling stations with integer percentages for turnout or leader's result against the number that would be expected by chance. The expected values were computed by Monte Carlo simulations of election results using the binomial distribution of ballots at every polling station. It is also instructive to look separately at the excess of polling stations with integer values for turnout (green curve) and leader's result (red curve). For the latter, the excess has stayed constant since 2011. However, the former has kept growing and reached its historic maximum in 2018. If these results are taken as evidence of electoral data manipulation, this might suggest that recent efforts to manipulate results have focused on turnout, presumably because the leader's result was believed to be high enough already.
Regional peaks
As we have shown previously [KSP16a] , integer peaks in the election data do not originate uniformly across all parts of the country; they are mostly localised in the same administrative regions, providing additional evidence in support of our hypothesis that these are not natural phenomena. Specific integer peaks can sometimes be traced to a particular city, or even an electoral constituency within a city, where turnout and/or leader's result are nearly identical at a large number of polling stations [KSP16b] .
The most prominent example from the last two elections was the city of Saratov in 2016. Its polling stations are the sole contributor to the sharp turnout peak at 64.3% and the leader's result peak at 62.2%, both visible in Figure 1 . These peaks are not integer and so are not counted towards the anomalies computed for Figure 2 . Curiously, their product -showing the fraction of leader's votes with respect to the total number of registered voters -is 0.643 × 0.622 = 0.400, which is exactly round.
